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Regional Effects of the Thrift Bailout
The billions of dollars of government debt being
raised to resolve the problems of hundreds of in-
solvent thrift institutions have drawn attention to
the possible regional effects of the so-called
"thrift bailout:' Regional effects are at issue be-
cause the insolvent institutions are concentrated
in a few states, such as Texas, while the govern-
ment obligations incurred to protect depositors
fallon the nation as a whole.
It has been argued that the states with large con-
centrations of ailing thrifts will experience
stronger economic growth at the expense of the
other states. This Letter takes a somewhat differ-
ent view. While government deposit insurance
protection should have a salutary effect on the
economies of states experiencing thrift insolven-
cies, it is not necessarily at the expense of
current taxpayers in other regions.
Two issues
At least two interesting questions arise when
evaluating the regional consequences of govern-
ment deposit insurance and the thrift bailout.
First, for a given set of losses, how are regional
economic growth rates affected when the federal
government protects depositors compared with a
situation in which the losses are borne region-
ally? Second, how does the financing of the
deposit insurance claims affect interregional
spending patterns, and hence regional economic
growth rates?
Regional effects
of deposit insurance guarantees
In a state plagued with thrift insolvencies, the
economy would be stronger with a federal gov-
ernment guarantee than if depositors (or others)
in the state had to absorb all of the losses. Dur-
ing the past several years, as conditions in the
thrift industry have deteriorated, insured deposi-
tors in the affected states have had no reason to
reduce spending. In contrast, if all deposits had
been uninsured, depositors would have been
more concerned about the risky activities that
thrifts were undertaking. This added concern
might have helped to limit the losses among
thrifts. More importantly for the purposes of this
Letter, for a given set of losses, uninsured deposi-
tors in an affected state would have reduced their
spending (increased saving) in response to their
loss of wealth. In effect, deposit insurance has
insulated depositors from the thrifts' losses, and,
thus, has blunted the negative economic effects
ofthe thrift crisis in the states with high con-
centrations of insolvencies.
However, the realization of this benefit in regions
with high concentrations of thrift failures does
not occur when the government actually pays out
its deposit insurance obligations. As pointed out
in a previous Letter (May 12, 1989), for all intents
and purposes, the wealth transferto the deposi-
tors of the troubled thrift institutions took place
long before the government's explicit decision to
finance the thrift bailout. Depositors of insolvent
thrifts, for the most part, have behaved all along
as if they were protected. Most, if not all, of the
positive effects of deposit insurance protection
already should be reflected in the economies of
the states plagued with thrift insolvencies. This
means that the government's outlay of billions of
dollars to acquire the assets or to accommodate
takeovers of insolvent thrifts should not provide a
further boost to the economies ofthese states.
Nevertheless, the expenditures made to resolve
the status of the ailing thrifts may allow un-
finished projects that had been lying idle to be
started up again as assets are sold off. To the
extent that such projects are geographically con-
centrated, the bailout might have some impact
on economic growth regionally. Also, to the ex-
tent that there is any friction in interregional
capital flows, the ongoing thrift bailoutcould
have some impact on the regional distribution of
funds. However, these effects are likely to be
small and do not stem from wealth transfers
per se.
Thus, the answer to the first question is that the
economies of regions with high concentrations of
thrift problems are better offwith deposit insur-
ance than they would have been in the absenceFABSF
of federal deposit insurance. However, this bene-
fit derives from the government's deposit
insurance guarantees, and the actual payment of
bailout funds should have little additional stim-
ulative effect on these regions' economies.
Paying the piper
Paying off actual deposit-insurance obligations
requires the federal government to raise funds,
whether through raising current taxes or issuing
debt. It is this need to raise funds to pay for the
bailout that has led some to argue that funding
the thrift bailout hurts the economies of states
with few thrift insolvencies.
Economies in regions with few thrift insolvencies
would be hurt iftaxes were raised to cover thrift
losses as institutions became solvent. The pay-
ments from the insurance funds would be region-
ally concentrated, while the taxes to cover the
expenditures would be spread throughout the
country. Taxpayers as a group would reduce their
spending on private goods and services as their
tax obligations rose. Ifthe bailout were financed
in this way, then the positive effects of deposit
insurance for depositors in some states would in-
deed come at the expense of current taxpayers in
other·states.
Debt financing
In practice, however, most of the expenses in-
curredby the deposit insurance system are being
financed with government debt, rather than with
current taxes. Moreover, the debt being issued to
cover the cost of the thrift bailout merely makes
explicit what had been implicit obligations of the
government.
The impact ofthe debt-financed bailout on the
saving and spending decisions of current tax-
payers depends on whether current taxpayers
view themselves as bearing the burden ofthe
debt, and whether the volume of the debt is sig-
nificantly different from what current taxpayers
previously had expected. Only if current tax-
payers assume they will bear the cost of the
bailout, and ifthe cost is appreciably higher than
expected, will they increase their rate of saving
further and cut back on consumption. Otherwise,
current spending will be little affected by the
bailout itself.
"Same as raising taxes?"
If taxpayers explicitly recognize the future tax
liability that is necessary to finance the thrift-
related government debt, then as information
about the size ofthe required expenditures be-
comes available, they would adjust their saving
enough to cover the change in their expected fu-
ture tax payments. Thus, if current taxpayers
assume they will bear the cost of the bailout, and
if the cost is appreciably higher than previously
anticipated, they will increase their rate of saving
further and cut back on consumption. However,
even in that case, the adjustment in spending
would hold for taxpayers in all states, including
those that have realized the benefits of deposit
insurance.
Under these circumstances, we would have what
economists call "Ricardian equivalence." That is,
when current taxpayers recognize how much of
the government's deposit insurance obligations
will be funded, they reduce their spending on
private goods and services to compensate for
their share of the funding. When the funding is
debt-financed, the adjustments are the same as if
the obligations were funded through current tax
revenues. This means that, if Ricardian equiv-
alence strictly holds, deposit insurance would
hurt the economies of states with few insolvent
thrifts as much if the deposit insurance obliga-
tions are funded by debt issuance as it would if
funded by higher current tax revenues.
...or intergenerational transfers?
On the other hand, ifcurrent taxpayers do not
adjust their rate of saving to cover higher future
tax burdens, the deposit-insurance related obli-
gation would not be taken into account in private
decision making. Neither insured depositors nor
current taxpayers would change their spending
patterns in response to the thrift losses. Thus,
current consumption would be higher and saving
would be less than they would be if tax revenues
were increased or if the Ricardian equivalence
were to hold. Moreover, as Herbert Stein points
out in a recent article (Wall Street Journal, June
25, 1990), a lower rate of saving would mean that
the capital stock would grow more slowly than it
would ifthe thrift losses did affect the spending
and saving decisions of current taxpayers or
depositors.In this case, the burden ofthe debt incurred in
the thrift bailout would be shifted to future gener-
ations. Higher current consumption would be
made possible at the expense of future consump-
tion, since future taxpayers would inherit more
debt, as well as a smaller capital stock with
which to service the debt.
This implies that the net benefit of deposit insur-
ance for some states would not represent a
burden on current taxpayers in states with few
thrift failures, but rather would represent a bur-
den on future taxpayers in all states. Thus, in this
case, current economic growth in regions with
few thrift failures would not suffer due to the cost
of the bailout, but future growth throughout the
nation eventually would be slower than it would
have been in the absence of the thrift bailout.
Which scenario?
There are differences of opinion concerning the
extent to which current taxpayers adjust con-
sumption and saving in response to higher gov-
ernment debt. This is part of a broader question
about the economic impact of government defi-
cits. However, to the extent that individuals do
not fully incorporate higher future debt obliga-
tions into their current spending and saving
decisions, the importance of changes in spend-
ing by current taxpayers associated with the
deposit insurance expenses is reduced.
Thus, the burden of paying for debt-financed
deposit insurance will retard spending and eco-
nomic growth in states with healthy thrifts only if
taxpayers incorporate the future costs of debt fi-
nancing in their current spending and saving
decisions. If taxpayers do not incorporate the fu-
ture debt servicing costs in their current
decisions, then the debt-financed bailout will
have little negative impact on current economic
conditions in states with few insolvent thrifts.
Conclusion
The rash of thrift insolvencies has been geo-
graphically concentrated, raising concerns that
the economies of states with high concentrations
of thrift failures may benefit at the expense of
states that have few thrift problems. Deposit in-
surance has helped the economies of the states
affected the most by thrift insolvencies by main-
taining the wealth of thrift depositors. However,
this benefit was associated with government obli-
gations to depositors, and does not occur as the
government writes the checks to fulfill its obliga-
tions. Therefore, the funding ofthe bailout should
have relatively little further effect on the econo-
mies of states with large concentrations of thrift
failures.
Moreover, since debt financing has been used to
cover the losses registered at thrifts, the costs of
the bailout maybe borne by future taxpayers
throughout the nation, rather than by current tax-
payers in states that are relatively free of thrift
failures. Thus, the concerns about negative ef-
fects on the current economies of regions that
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